Corruption & Accountability

POLS 4641: The Science of Cities

Today’s Agenda

Given everything we’ve discussed about US local politics over the past few weeks…

  • Vertically overlapping governments

  • Single-party dominance or nonpartisan elections

  • Limited attention and participation

…how do citizens monitor and hold their elected representatives accountable?

  • “Corruption and accountability” is a huge topic.

    • (What was I thinking?)
  • But let’s focus our attention today on the role played by local news media.

Political Machines

  • In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, major US cities were often dominated by single-party “political machines”.

  • Machine politics is a sort of “perverse accountability” (Stokes 2005).

    • Rather than voters monitoring politicians and rewarding/punishing them for what they do in office…

    • …political machines monitor their voters, and reward them with patronage / benefits in exchange for votes.

The Fall of the Machines

  • The demise of machine politics (and Tammany Hall in particular) is overdetermined:

Local News and Accountability

  • It is tricky to credibly demonstrate that local news media causally reduces corruption.

    • Maybe Thomas Nast’s cartoons didn’t bring down Tammany Hall. Maybe he felt comfortable publishing the cartoons because they were already on the way out?
  • Let’s discuss two studies I like that address this question.

Isolated Capital Cities

  • US state capitals that are more geographically isolated from the state’s population tend to have more corruption (Campante and Do 2014).

  • Why? Journalists cluster near population centers, so isolated capitals receive less newspaper coverage of state politics.

  • Less coverage → less informed voters → less accountability → more corruption.

  • They measure isolation as the distance between the capital and the “population centroid” of the state.

Exposing Corrupt Politicians

  • Brazil’s federal government randomly audits municipalities and publicly releases the results (Ferraz and Finan 2008).

  • Incumbents found to have engaged in corruption were significantly more likely to lose reelection.

  • The effect was largest in municipalities with local radio stations — consistent with the media-accountability mechanism.

The Decline of Local Newspapers

  • Local newspapers were historically sustained by advertising revenue — classifieds, display ads, and circulars.

  • The internet destroyed that model: Craigslist eliminated classifieds; Google and Facebook captured display advertising.

  • As ad revenue collapsed, papers cut newsroom staff, reduced coverage, and in many cases closed entirely.

  • The result: dramatic declines in both circulation and the number of journalists covering local government.

Wrap Up

  • There are half a million elected officials in the United States. Voters cannot hold them accountable without information.

  • Local journalism is the primary source of that information — and it has been in freefall for thirty years.

  • I’m cautiously optimistic that LLMs can increase the productivity enough to make small, digital local newspapers a viable business model.

  • But effective investigative journalism requires “boots on the ground”, for journalists to actually live in the places they cover (Campante and Do 2014).

References

Anzia, Sarah F., and Jessica Trounstine. 2025. “Civil Service Adoption in America: The Political Influence of City Employees.” American Political Science Review 119 (2): 549–65. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055424000431.
Campante, Filipe R., and Quoc Anh Do. 2014. “Isolated Capital Cities, Accountability, and Corruption: Evidence from US States.” American Economic Review 104 (8): 2456–81. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.8.2456.
Ferraz, Claudio, and Frederico Finan. 2008. “Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil’s Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 123 (2): 703–45. https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2008.123.2.703.
Stokes, Susan C. 2005. “Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina.” The American Political Science Review 99 (3): 315–25. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055405051683.
Wolfinger, Raymond E. 1972. “Why Political Machines Have Not Withered Away and Other Revisionist Thoughts.” Journal of Politics 34 (2): 365–98.